In many developing countries, governments often use Minimum support prices (MSPs) as interventions to (i) safeguard farmers' income against crop price falls, and (ii) ensure sufficient and balanced production of different crops. In this paper, we examine two questions: (1) What is the impact of MSPs on the farmers' crop selection and production decisions, future crop availabilities, and farmers' expected profits? (2) What is the impact of strategic farmers on crop selection and production decisions, future crop availabilities, and farmers' expected profits? To explore these questions, we present a model in which the market consists of two types of farmers (with heterogeneous production costs): myopic farmers (who make their crop selection and production decisions based on recent market prices) and strategic farmers (who make their decisions by taking all other farmers' decisions into consideration). By examining the dynamic interactions among these farmers for the case when there are two (complementary or substitutable) crops for each farmer to select to grow, we obtain the following results. First, we show that, regardless of the values of the MSPs offered to the crops, the price disparity between the crops worsens as the complementarity between the crops increases.
Introduction
In many developing countries, the agricultural sector is important because: (1) it offers a source of income to a large number of small rural households, and (2) it provides a stable food supply for the country. As such, developing efficient and effective agro-policies to improve farmers' earnings and to stabilize crop availabilities and prices are critical (Thorbecke 1982) . While governments in developing countries design and develop a wide variety of agro-policies ranging from input subsidies (for seeds and fertilizers, power, etc.) to output subsidies (for storage and transportation), in this paper, we shall focus on a particular type of output subsidies that is called the Minimum Support Price (MSPs).
MSPs for different crops are offered by governments in many developing countries like Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Pakistan, and Thailand. For example, in 2017, the Indian 3 In this paper we develop a parsimonious model to analyze the impact of MSPs on farmers' earnings, crop availabilities, and crop prices by considering a setting in which there are two (complementary or substitutable) crops from which each farmer can choose one crop to cultivate. In addition to heterogeneous production costs for each crop, we also consider the case when the market is comprised of myopic farmers (who make their crop selection and production decisions based on recent market pries) and strategic farmers (who make their decisions by taking all other farmers' decisions into consideration). By examining the dynamic interactions among myopic and strategic farmers, our model enables us to examine two research questions:
1. What is the impact of MSPs on the farmers' crop selection and production decisions, future crop availabilities, and farmers' expected revenues? 2. What is the impact of strategic farmers on crop selection and production decisions, future crop availabilities, and farmers' expected revenues?
Our equilibrium analysis enables us to obtain the following results. First, we find in Corollaries 1 and 6 that, regardless of the values of MSPs, the price disparity between the crops worsens as the complementarity between the crops increases. Second, we show in Proposition 5 that MSP is not always beneficial. In Proposition 5, specifically, we show that moderately low MSP for a crop will degrade the expected profits of the farmers growing the crop if the number of strategic farmers is very small. Thus, choosing an inappropriate MSP for a crop, especially when there are very few strategic farmers, can actually defeat the intended goal of offering MSP for the crop, which is to benefit the farmers growing the crop. Also, we show in Proposition 4 that when the proportion of strategic farmers is small, offering moderately low MSP for a crop can actually cause fewer strategic farmers to grow that crop. Third, in Proposition 3, we find that the total production of a crop is increasing in the MSP offered for the crop. Therefore, a bad choice of MSPs can cause the production quantity disparity between crops to worsen. Hence, to reduce quantity disparity between crops, a carefully designed MSP policy is critical. Finally, through formulating an optimization problem for a policy-maker to choose crop MSPs in order to maximize social welfare, we illustrate that offering MSPs to complementary (i.e., dissimilar) crops has the potential to achieve higher social welfare at a lower expected expenditure to the policy-maker.
Chintapalli and Tang: Impact of minimum support prices in the presence of strategic farmers 4 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature related to MSPs. In Section 3 we introduce the model and discuss various assumptions. To explicate our analysis about myopic and strategic farmers' crop selection and production decisions, we examine the case when MSPs are not present in Section 4. Section 5 extends our analysis to the case when MSPs are present. In Section 6 we formulate and discuss the optimization problem of the government whose objective is to set MSPs in order to improve farmers' welfare and crop balance. We conclude in Section 7.
Literature Review
Our research pertains to agro-policies that affect both crop selection and crop production by myopic and strategic farmers. The literature on MSPs is vast in the agricultural economics discipline and the reader is referred to Tripathi et al. (2013) and the references therein for a good synopsis on MSPs in developing countries. Without accounting for the price interactions between crops with MSP support and those crops without MSP support, Fox (1956) develops macro-economics analysis to evaluate the impact of MSPs and finds that MSPs can mitigate the fall in GNP during a recession. Dantwala (1967) finds that in spite of the increasing MSPs, the crop market prices continue to rise. More recently, Subbarao et al. (2011) shows evidence that the increase in market price is caused by the increase in MSPs. In the same vein, Chand (2003) presents qualitative assessment of the ill-effects of the wheat-and-rice-centric MSPs on the Indian economy. Chhatre et al. (2016) point out that many farmers in India moved to cultivating high-yield varieties of rice and wheat due to the wheat-and-rice-centric MSPs offered by the Indian government. The authors also identify the various socio-economic and environmental problems associated with an improper choice of MSPs. Besides the Indian context, Spitze (1978) Recent papers on agricultural operations in OM literature include: (i) Tang et al. (2015) , Chen and Tang (2015) , Parker et al. (2016) , Liao et al. (2017) focus on the economic value of disseminating agricultural information to the farmers, (ii) Kazaz and Webster (2011) , Dawande et al. (2013) , Huh and Lall (2013) examine the issue of resource and inventory management, (iii) Huh et al. (2012) , Federgruen et al. (2015) , An et al. (2015) focus on Chintapalli and Tang: Impact of minimum support prices in the presence of strategic farmers 5 contract farming and farmer aggregation, and (iv) Hu et al. (2016) , Alizamir et al. (2015) , Guda et al. (2016) examine social responsibility and public policy issues arising from the agricultural sector.
While our paper is related to group (iv), it differs from the these papers in the following manner. First, Hu et al. (2016) focus on the value of strategic farmers in the context of a single crop with a deterministic demand function. They show that a tiny fraction of strategic farmers can stabilize the steady state prices. They also extend their analysis to two crops with independent market prices. In contrast, our goal is to evaluate the impact of MSPs on farmers' crop selection and production decisions, and on the market prices of two crops with dependent and yet stochastic market price.
Second, Alizamir et al. (2015) focus on the impact of federal policy on agriculture industry in the United States. They compare two schemes (Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) programs) with respect to (i) farmers' welfare, (ii) federal expenditure, and (iii) consumer welfare. While PLC is akin to MSP, our paper differs from Alizamir et al. (2015) in three aspects. First, they assume there are finite number of farmers, and the production of each farmer can affect the market price (i.e., farmers are price setters). In contrast, our context is that of developing countries, and we consider infinitesimally small farmers whose individual decisions do not affect the market price (i.e., farmers are price-takers). Second, they analyze the case of only one crop, while we consider two crops that can be substitutes or complements. Hence, by capturing the interaction between two crops in our model, we analyze the simultaneous impact of the MSP of each crop on the production of both the crops. Third, they do not consider the existence of myopic and strategic farmers, while we consider a mixture of both myopic and strategic farmers in our model. Our model fits well in the context of developing countries where a large portion of the farming communities are smallholders who are myopic: their crop selection and production decisions are purely based on the most recently oberved market price.
Finally, Guda et al. (2016) examine the role of MSPs in emerging economies, but there are two fundamental differences between our paper and theirs. The first difference is that we assume heterogeneity in farmers' production costs, while they assume homogeneous production costs. In general, the cost of cultivating a crop can vary across farmers depending on the local soil, the climatic conditions, and the farming practices they employ. Second, Chintapalli and Tang: Impact of minimum support prices in the presence of strategic farmers 6 they consider a single crop and relegate the case of multiple crops as future research due to the inherent complexity. As such, our paper attempts to examine the impact of the MSPs of two crops on the availabilities of one another.
Model Preliminaries
We consider two crops (A and B) to be produced by heterogeneous farmers whose production costs are uniformly distributed over the interval [−0.5, 0.5] as in the Hotelling's model. These two crops can be substitutes (e.g., rice and wheat) or complements (e.g., rice and pulses/lentils). For a farmer located at x ∈ [−0.5, 0.5], his costs of producing crops A and B are given by c A (x) = x + 0.5 and c B (x) = 0.5 − x, respectively. We assume that the farmers are infinitesimally small so that each farmer can produce 1 unit of a crop and each farmer is a price taker.
In our model, the market price of a crop depends on the available quantity of the crop.
Let q kT t denote the "total" availability of crop k ∈ {A, B} in period t and let p k t denote the market price of crop k ∈ {A, B} in period t. For ease of exposition, we normalize the size of markets to 1 so that q kT t 1 for k ∈ {A, B}. Throughout this paper, we assume that the market price p t k for crop k ∈ {A, B} in period t satisfies:
where ρ (> 0) is the price sensitivity, and α is a measure of substitutability (if α > 0) or complementarity (if α < 0) between the two crops. As commonly assumed in the literature for substitutable/complementary products, we shall assume that α < ρ. The random variables k t (k ∈ {A, B}) denote the market uncertainty in period t. We assume k t are iid (across t and k) with mean 0, variance σ 2 and with distribution and density functions F (·) and f (·), respectively. 2 We also assume that the distribution F (·) has support over a range of value so that the market price p k t in non-negative. Let F (·) = (1 − F (·)) denote the complementary cumulative distribution of k t . The expected profit of a farmer at location x who grows crop k ∈ {A, B} is given by:
2 To keep the notation simple, we assume that A t and B t follow the same distribution. However, our analysis can be extended to the case of different distributions.
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For ease of exposition, we define r ≡ ρ − α (> 0), so that r measures the "dissimilarity" between the two crops, and φ ≡ a − ρ+α 2
, which corresponds to the expected market price when half of the market grows A (grows B) (i.e., when q AT t = q BT t = 0.5). Finally, wherever applicable, we denote the price vector in period t by
To simplify our exposition and our analysis (e.g., by ruling out the boundary equilibrium solution), we shall make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1. In each period, each farmer will not be idle and will select exactly one crop to grow.
First, the non-idling assumption is reasonable especially when the farmer's production cost is lower than the market price p k t in general. Second, due to economies of scale, small land-holders in emerging markets cannot afford to grow multiple crops.
Next, let ∆p t be the price disparity between crops A and B in period t. By applying (1) and the fact that r = ρ − α, we obtain:
. To ensure that the price disparity ∆p t is stable over time so that we can rule out boundary equilibrium solution, we shall make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The dissimilarity between two crops r satisfies: 0 < r ≡ (ρ − α) < 1.
Also, the variance of the market uncertainty is sufficiently less than 1 (i.e., σ 2 << 1).
Since, r measures the "dissimilarity" between two crops, we can treat the crops to be substitutes if r is small and to be complements if r is large. Furthermore, because 0 < r < 1 , |q A t − q B t | 1, and E[ξ t ] = 0, it is easy to check that |E[∆p t ]| r < 1, for all t. Furthermore, when |E[∆p t ]| 1 and σ 2 << 1, we can ascertain that |∆p t | < 1 nearly always holds so that we can effectively assume P(|∆p t | < 1) 1.
We formalize this finding in the lemma below.
Lemma 1. Let the random variable X ∼ U [−β, β] denote the type of the farmer so that the production costs of crops A and B for farmer who is located at X = x are given by x + β and β − x respectively. Then,
Hence, for a given r ∈ (0, 1), we have P (|∆pt| 2β) → 0 if β >> σ.
Without loss of generality, we scale β to 1 in our model and assume that σ is sufficiently small (i.e., σ << 1). Hence, by virtue of Lemma 1, there will be a positive production of each crop in every period.
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Assumption 3. There are two types of farmers in the market: myopic and strategic.
Also, the proportion of strategic farmers is θ ∈ [0, 1].
In our model, we assume that myopic farmers are those who make their crop selection and production decisions purely based on recent market prices. However, strategic farmers are forward looking, and they make their decisions by taking all other farmers' decisions into consideration. For the convenience of notation, we define z + = max{z, 0} and let θ ≡ (1 − θ) throughout this paper.
Model Analysis: In the Absence of MSPs
To explicate the analysis that involves crop selection and crop production by myopic and strategic farmers with heterogeneous production costs, we first examine the case when MSPs are absent. (We shall extend our analysis to the case when MSPs are present in Section 5.) By considering different decision making mechanisms adopted by different types of farmers, we now determine their crop selection and production decisions in period t for any realized market prices in period t − 1 (i.e., p k t−1 for k ∈ {A, B}).
Myopic farmers' crop selection and production decisions in period t Let q km t denote the quantity of crop k ∈ {A, B} to be produced by the myopic farmers in period t, and let p km t denote the price of crop k in period t as "anticipated" by the myopic farmers. In our model, each myopic farmer anticipates that p 
. By applying Assumption 2, we can conclude that τ m ∈ (−0.5, 0.5). Given the threshold τ m , the segment {x : −0.5 x < τ m } of myopic farmers will grow only crop A, while the segment {x : τ m < x 0.5} of myopic farmers will grow only crop B.
Strategic farmers' crop selection and production decisions in period t Let q ks t denote the quantity of crop k ∈ {A, B} to be produced by the strategic farmers in period t, and let p ks t denote the price of crop k in period t as "anticipated" by the strategic farmers. By taking all other farmers' decisions into consideration, we shall show that strategic farmers can actually anticipate the expected market price in equilibrium so that p
. Also, we shall show later that, among the strategic farmers, the segment {x : −0.5 x < τ s } will grow only A and the segment {x : τ s < x 0.5} will grow only B, Figure 1 depicts the crop selection and production decisions of myopic and strategic farmers. Also, by noting that the market consists of θ strategic and θ ≡ (1 − θ) myopic farmers, the figure depicts the overall crop selection and production. Recall that τ s and τ m are the threshold values associated with the myopic and the strategic farmers, respectively. Therefore, the total quantities of crop A produced by the myopic and the strategic farmers are q availability of crop B, it is easy to see that the fraction of myopic farmers producing crop B is given by 0.5 − τ m and that of strategic farmers producing crop B is 0.5 − τ s . Hence, the total availability of crop B is q
4.1. Farmers' crop selection and production decisions in period t in equilibrium
While the threshold τ m has been established earlier, the determination of the threshold τ s is more involved because each strategic farmer takes the crop selection and production decisions of all other farmers into consideration. We now present the following proposition that states the farmers' crop selection and production decisions in period t as depicted in Figure 1 . In preparation, let us define a term that will prove useful in our analysis. Let:
where r ≡ (ρ − α) > 0 measures the "dissimilarity" between the two crops. Notice thatr is increasing in r.
Proposition 1. (Crop selection and production decisions in period t for any realized P t−1 ) For any realized prices P t−1 , the equilibrium crop selection and production decisions of the farmers in period t can be described as follows:
1. Myopic farmers' decisions: The amount of crop A produced by myopic farmers is given by q
2. Strategic farmers' decisions: The amount of crop A produced by strategic farmers is given by q 3. Total production: The total production of crop A is given by q AT t = τ + 0.5, where
Even though we focus on crop A in the above proposition, the quantity of crop B produced by myopic and strategic farmers can be obtained through symmetry as q Bm t = 0.5 − τ m and q Bs t = 0.5 − τ s , respectively. Also, the total production of crop B is q
For any given proportion of strategic farmers θ in the market, the first and the second statements of Proposition 1 describe the equilibrium production decisions of the myopic and strategic farmers through the threshold values τ m and τ s , respectively. By combining the corresponding production decisions of these two types of farmers, the third statement gives the total availability of each crop in equilibrium. It is interesting to note that, when θ = 1 (i.e., all the farmers are strategic), τ = τ s = 0 so that q As t = q Bs t = 0.5. Hence, when the market consists of strategic farmers only, half of the strategic farmers will grow A and the remaining half will grow B. Also, the realized market price in period (t − 1) has no bearing on the strategic farmers' crop selection and production decisions in period t. 
, and
Also, for any location x ∈ [−0.5, 0.5], let π m t (x) and π s t (x) denote the equilibrium profits of a myopic and a strategic farmers who is located at x, respectively. By using (2) and Proposition 1 that a farmer of type v ∈ {m, s} will grow crop A if x τ v , and will grow crop B, otherwise, we can apply (4) and the production costs c A (x) = 0.5 + x and c B (x) = 0.5 − x to show that the profit of a farmer of type v ∈ {m, s} located at x is given as:
Impact of crop dissimilarity r
Now, let us use the results stated in Proposition 1 to examine the effect of dissimilarity between the crops (i.e., r) on the crop availability disparity (i.e., ∆q t ≡ q AT t − q BT t ) and crop price disparity (i.e., ∆p t ≡ p (3), we can conclude that the crop availability disparity |∆q t | is decreasing in the crop dissimilarity r when θ > 0 and it is independent of r when θ = 0. This result implies that the presence of strategic farmers can improve the balance of crop availability.
Next, let us examine the crop price disparity (i.e., ∆p t ≡ p (3) is increasing in r, we can conclude that the expected crop price disparity is increasing in crop dissimilarity r. Moreover, becauser < r < 1, we can conclude that the expected crop price disparity will be dampened over time. The key results can be summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Impact of crop dissimilarity r).
Crop availability disparity:
The disparity between the total production quantities of the crops decreases with r if there are strategic farmers. That is ∂|∆qt| ∂r
where ∆q t = q 
Impact of recent market prices P t−1
We now use the results stated in Proposition 1 to examine the impact of the realized market prices P t−1 in period t − 1 on the production decisions of different types of farmers in period t. To avoid repetition, we shall focus on the case when ∆p t−1 = p we obtain the following results:
Corollary 2 (Impact of realized market prices P t−1 ). Suppose ∆p t−1 > 0.
Then:
1. Myopic farmers' decisions:
> 0, and
Stratetic farmers' decisions:
∂τ s ∂∆p t−1 = −r 2 < 0, and
3. Total production:
=r 2r > 0, and
4. Expected profit of farmer of type v ∈ {m, s}:
v , and
Because myopic farmers make their crop selection and production decisions in period t based on the realized market prices P t−1 observed in period t − 1, more myopic farmers will select to grow the crop that has the higher price in the previous period. This observation explains the first statement of Corollary 2, which stipulates that the larger the price disparity |∆p t−1 | in period t − 1, the larger is the disparity in the production quantities of the myopic farmers in period t.
Next, let us consider the second statement. Because each strategic farmer knows the behavior of the myopic farmers and anticipates the behavior of all the other strategic farmers, he anticipates an increase in the production quantity of crop A can cause the price of the crop to go down further. For this reason, fewer strategic farmers will choose to grow A in period t as stated in the second statement.
While the realized market prices P t−1 have opposite effects on the myopic and strategic farmers as shown in the first two statements, the third statement shows that the strategic farmers can never nullify the impact of the decisions of the myopic farmers (and hence the impact of P t−1 ) on the aggregate product availability in period t. Specifically, the product Chintapalli and Tang: Impact of minimum support prices in the presence of strategic farmers 13 with higher price in period t − 1 is always produced more in period t than the product with lower price in period t − 1. Furthermore, according to the fourth statement of the corollary, a higher value of ∆p t−1 causes a higher availability of crop A in period t and hurts the expected profits of the farmers (both myopic and strategic) who grow crop A in equilibrium in period t due to the increased production of crop A. Figure 2 pictorially illustrates these three effects that are stated in Corollary 2. 
Impact of the proportion of strategic farmers θ
Let us examine the impact of the proportion of strategic farmers θ on the farmers' decisions.
By considering the equilibrium outcomes as stated in Proposition 1 along with the fact thatr = θr 1+rθ as given in (3), it is easy to show that:
Corollary 3 (Impact of the proportion of strategic farmers θ). Suppose
Myopic farmers' decisions:
∂τ m ∂θ = 0 and
2. Strategic farmers' decisions:
Similarly,
The first two statements show that the production quantity of crop A produced by the myopic (strategic) farmers is decreasing (increasing) in θ. As stated in statement 3, the submodularity of q AT t (or τ ) in (θ, ∆p t−1 ) asserts that the strategic farmers "counteract" the impact of past market prices on the total production quantity q AT t in period t, and this "counteracting" effect is more pronounced as the proportion of strategic farmers θ increases.
Chintapalli and Tang: Impact of minimum support prices in the presence of strategic farmers
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The fourth statement shows that the profit of a farmer (either myopic or strategic) growing crop A (B) in equilibrium is increasing (decreasing) in θ. Moreover, the supermodularity of π v t in (θ, ∆p t−1 ) for x < τ v indicates that the negative impact of past price difference on the farmers growing crop A is mitigated. In summary, the destabilizing effect of past prices on the current expected equilibrium profits of the farmers is mitigated as the proportion of strategic farmers increases.
To summarize, we have shown that past prices will have an impact on the farmers' crop selection and production decisions, product availability, and crops' market prices in the future periods. If a large portion of the farmers are myopic (i.e., θ is small) then the crop with higher price in period t − 1 (say, crop A) will be grown in abundance in period t. Due to the high availability of crop A, its price in period t is very likely to be low, which hurts the earnings of the those farmers who grow crop A. Consequently, high fluctuations in the past crop prices will destabilize farmers' profits in the current period. To safeguard the earnings of the farmers, many governments in developing countries offer MSPs. However, will MSPs create economic value to farmers? We examine this question in the next section.
Minimum Support Prices
We now extend our analysis presented in the last section to incorporate crop MSPs. To
higher MSPs is detrimental to the farmers, we shall assume throughout this section that the difference between the MSPs of two crops is bounded by 1 (i.e., |m Proposition 2 (Equilibrium under MSPs). For any realized prices P t−1 and for any given MSPs (m A t , m B t ), the equilibrium crop selection and production decisions of the farmers in period t can be described as follows:
1. Myopic farmers' decisions: The amount of crop A produced by myopic farmers is given byq
Strategic farmers' decisions:
The amount of crop A produced by strategic farmers is given byq As t = θ(τ s + 0.5), wherê
3. Total production: The total production of crop A is given byq AT t =τ + 0.5 wherê
By usingτ m from (6) and the fact thatτ = θτ s + θτ m , we can obtainτ s by solving (7) as an equation that involvesτ s as the only variable. Once we determineτ s , we can retrievê τ accordingly. Also, it can be shown that Proposition 2 reduces to Proposition 1 when
Note that (7) can be alternatively written asτ
We will use either of these two definitions ofτ s in our analysis, based on convenience.
7 First, to ensure that the crop prices are non-negative we require, p Next, consider a special case when all farmers are strategic so that θ = 1. In this case, statement 2 reveals that, when θ = 1,r = 0,τ =τ s ,q AT t = (0.5 +τ s ),q BT t = (0.5 −τ s ), and (7) can be simplified as:τ
0, which implies that
By noting thatτ s is independent of P t−1 , we can conclude that, when all farmers are strategic, the production quantity of each crop k is increasing in its own MSP m k t . Hence, a policy-maker can always select appropriate MSPs to attain a balanced mixture of both crops when all farmers are strategic. However, when the market consists of both myopic and strategic farmers, the selection of proper MSPs is much more complex, and we shall discuss this in Section 6.
Finally, the results stated in Proposition 2 possess the same characteristics as the results stated in Proposition 1. First, observe that the threshold associated with the strategic farmers given in (7) involves two components: (i) the response to the actions of myopic farmers (which is the first term in the RHS of (7), i.e., −rτ m , which is analogous to the expression of τ s given in the second statement of Proposition 1), and (ii) the response to the crop MSPs announced (which is the second term in the RHS of (7)). Thus, MSPs influence the decisions of the strategic farmers in two ways. First, they influence the decisions of strategic farmers via the decisions of the myopic farmers as explained in (i), and we term this effect as the indirect effect. Second, the MSPs influence the decisions of strategic farmers directly as explained in (ii), and we term this effect as the direct effect. There two effects play an important role in our analysis of the impact of MSPs.
It can be shown that the thresholdτ s for strategic farmers is decreasing and the total product availability thresholdτ is increasing in the thresholdτ m for myopic farmers.
Specifically, it is easy to observe from Proposition 2 that ∂τ s ∂τ m < 0 and ∂τ ∂τ m > 0. The same characteristics of the thresholds can be observed from Proposition 1 as well. Essentially, these two characteristics ofτ s andτ imply that strategic farmers "counteract" the actions of myopic farmers; however, strategic farmers' counter-actions cannot fully nullify the impact of myopic farmers even when MSPs are offered. Also, it can be shown that the findings made in Corollary 1 regarding the impact of crop disimilarity r continued to hold for any given MSPs of the crops (we refer the reader to Corollary 6 in Appendix A).
In addition to the production quantities as stated in Proposition 2, we can compute the farmers' profits in equilibrium in the presence of MSPs (m
By considering (9), we can use the thresholdsτ m ,τ s andτ stated in Proposition 2 along with the production cost c A (x) = 0.5 + x and c B (x) = 0.5 − x to determine the expected profit in equilibrium for a farmer of type v ∈ {m, s} and who is located at x in period t as:
Also, by using statement 3 of Proposition 2 stating thatq 5.1. Impact of P t−1 and θ We now examine the impact of the most recently realized prices P t−1 and the fraction of strategic farmers θ on the equilibrium outcomes, which are as stated in Proposition 2, in the presence of MSPs. Corollary 4, which is an analogue to Corollary 2, explains the impact of P t−1 on the equilibrium. For ease of exposition, we shall focus on crop A only.
Corollary 4 (Impact of the most recently realized prices P t−1 under MSPs). 4. Expected profit of farmer of type v ∈ {m, s}:
For any given MSPs (m
It is easy to check that Corollary 4 resembles Corollary 2 (for any given p B t−1 ) even when MSPs are present; hence, it can be interpreted in the same manner.
Next, we examine the impact of the proportion of strategic farmers θ on the equilibirium outcomes. Corollary 5 is analogous to Corollary 3. However, because of the MSPs, the analysis is more involved in the sense that the result hinges on the comparison between the thresholdτ m , as defined in (6), and the thresholdτ s 0 , whereτ s 0 is the value ofτ s (as defined in (7)) evaluated at θ = 0. In other words,τ
It can shown that depending on the parameters and the distribution F (·), the difference , where this condition depends on the value of MSPs. This condition is not present in Corollary 3 because, in the absence of MSPs, strategic farmers respond only to myopic farmers' decisions that are determined by the realized prices P t−1 . However, in the presence of MSPs, MSPs have a direct impact (along with P t−1 ) on the decisions of myopic farmers as described in (6).
Also, MSPs have both direct and indirect (via the actions of myopic farmers) impacts on strategic farmers as described in (7), which makes the decisions of strategic farmers more intricate. This observation calls for more attention to the analysis of the impact of MSPs on farmers' decisions. We explore this in the following section.
Impact of MSPs
We now examine the impact of MSPs on the farmer's crop selection and production decisions (again, we focus on crop A alone). In preparation, let us define the following two bounds on the MSP of crop A. 8 By doing this, we can observe the impact of MSPs when (i) they have only the direct effect, and (ii) they have both the direct and the indirect effects, on the decisions of strategic farmers given byτ s in (7). By using the two bounds m The first statement of Proposition 3 shows that the availability of a crop is always increasing in the MSP offered for the crop. Due to this increase in the availability of the crop, its market price drops as its MSP increases. Hence, the equilibrium expected market price of crop A is decreasing in m A t (and increasing in m B t with details omitted). Therefore, to achieve a better balance of different crops, a policy-maker has to account for the effect of MSP of one crop on the production of the other crop. Further, it is always possible to obtain a desired production-mix of the crops using MSPs. To see why, supposeτtarget is the targeted production of crop A (so that 1 −τtarget is the targeted production of crop B). Without loss of generality, assume that initially we set m 
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MSP for a crop can cause strategic farmers to produce less of the crop. We shall explore this seemingly counter-intuitive result in more detail.
Due to the complexity of the analysis, we shall consider a special case when the market
, k ∈ {A, B}, instead of a general probability distribution F (·). In preparation, we let:
Notice that m > 0 when a is sufficiently large and δ is sufficiently small. By considering m,
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 (Impact of MSPs on strategic farmers). Suppose the given MSP 3 when the MSP is moderately low, it is not true for strategic farmers when θ < θ 0 , as shown in Proposition 4.
The rationale for this counter-intuitive result as stated in Proposition 4 is as follows.
Strategic farmers know that, when the MSP of crop A is moderate, more myopic farmers will grow crop A as m A t increases. The resulting increase in production of crop A is substantial when θ is small because, by using statement 1 of Proposition 2 (i.e.,q Am = θ(τ m + 0.5)), it is easy to see that:
when m To summarize, we find that, when the MSP of crop A is moderately low, increasing the MSP m A t can cause fewer strategic farmers to grow crop A (and more strategic farmers to grow crop B). This seemingly counter-intuitive finding offers a hint regarding the condition(s) under which offering MSP for a crop can hurt the earnings of farmers who grow that crop. We shall explore this next.
Impact of MSPs on farmers' profits
We now examine the impact of the MSP of crop A on the ex-ante expected profits of farmers of each type v ∈ {m, s} as given by (10). By differentiating (10) with respect to m A t and by using the fact that the expected market price E[p t can benefit farmers who grow A as well as those who grow B. Second, relative to the case when MSP is absent, offering a moderately low MSP for a crop, say, crop A, can make those farmers who grow A to become worse off and make those farmers who grow B to become better off. When this happens, the actual impact of MSP for crop A violates the intended goal for offering MSP for crop A (which is intended to benefit farmers who grow crop A). Therefore, selecting an appropriate level of MSP is crucial and a policy-maker has to exercise sufficient care in choosing the right MSPs m k t , k ∈ {A, B} to ensure that they: (i) benefit the farmers, especially those who grow crop k, and (ii) balance the crop availabilities for the consumer. We explore this topic further in Section 6.
Selection of efficient MSPs
Lastly, in this section, we formulate the optimization problem of a social planner (i.e., the policy-maker or the government) whose objective is to choose crop MSPs such that the farmers and the consumers can be benefited to the largest extent at the lowest possible total expenditure. First, we define farmer surplus in period t as follows: 
Proposition 2. Second, We capture the disutility of the consumers through the imbalance of crop availability as follows:
Third, the total expected expenditure incurred by the policy-maker by setting MSPs m A t and m B t is given by:
because government has to bear an expected expenditure of E[m is as given in Proposition 2.
Using F t , C t and K t , we can define the social welfare (maximization) problem (SWP t ) in period t as below:
where λ ∈ (0, 1) and (1 − λ) ∈ (0, 1) are the exogenous weights associated by the policymaker to farmers' welfare and consumers' welfare, respectively, η is the sensitivity of the policy-maker (or the government) to its expenditure, M is the maximum limit of the MSP to be awarded to a crop, and B is a bound on the expected expenditure to be incurred (we can consider the constraint K t (m A t , m B t ) B as a budget constraint). Having analyzed the impact of MSPs chosen by a policy-maker on farmers' crop selection and production decisions in the earlier section, we now focus on the effect of crop dissimilarity r (i.e., substitutability or complementarity) on the optimal choice of crop MSPs and crop balance. Offering crop MSPs without understanding the degree of complementarity Chintapalli and Tang: Impact of minimum support prices in the presence of strategic farmers 27 (or substitutability) between the crops being supported by the MSPs can destabilize the availability of those crops to the consumers. For instance, MSPs focused on wheat and rice (which are substitutes) caused a severe shortage of coarse cereals and oil seeds and an over-production of rice and wheat in the Indian economy (Chand 2003, Parikh and Chandrashekhar 2007) . Hence, we note that it is important to explore the impact of r, which measures the "dissimilarity" between the two crops, on the choice of MSPs and the consequent production decisions of farmers.
Given the complexity of the above problem, we solve it numerically and draw some insights. The parameter values used in our numerical example are a = 1, ρ = 0.7, p . We take the "weight" λ = 0.1, 0.5, 1, which correspond to low, medium and high values, respectively. In our discussion we focus on the impact of crop dissimilarity (r) on the optimal choice of MSPs.
We change r by varying α while retaining ρ constant (i.e., ρ = 0.7).
As shown in Figure 5 , the optimal value of MSP for crop A is higher than that for crop B, for each value of λ, because our example is based on the case when the previous period price of crop A is lower than that of crop B (i.e., 0.1 = p A t−1 < p B t−1 = 0.9). Because of this past price differential, more myopic farmers choose to grow crop B and so a larger MSP should be offered for crop A in order to entice a few of these farmers to switch to growing crop A from growing crop B. Furthermore, we notice that the optimal MSPs of the crops are increasing in r, which can be explained as follows. When r increases (i.e., α decreases while ρ is left unchanged), the expected prices of the crops increase, for any given production quantities of the crops.
11 Hence it is less likely that the realized market prices are lower than the crop MSPs. As such, the government can afford to increase the MSPs in order to benefit the farmers. Thus, for any given budget, government will be able to offer higher MSPs for complementary crops (like rice/wheat and pulses/vegetables) than for substitutable crops (like rice and wheat).
Furthermore, when a policy-maker gives higher importance to the welfare of the farmers (i.e., as λ increases), the crop MSPs also increase, because, when appropriately chosen, higher MSPs improve farmers' revenues. The case when λ = 1 corresponds to the extreme case when a policy-maker is concerned only about the welfare of the farmers but not at all about the welfare of the consumers.
11 Note that by differentiating (1) with respect to α, we obtain for k ∈ {A, B} that Optimal MSPs for crops A and B for low, medium, and high λ values.
Next, the plots in Figure 6 indicate that the difference between the MSPs of crops A and B is decreasing in r, for any given value of λ. That is, as the complementarity between the crops (i.e., r) increases the crop MSPs have to be set in such a way that the difference between them decreases, in order to maintain a balance in crop production quantities. In other words, to maintain a balance of complementary crops (eg., rice and vegetables), a policy-maker should offer comparable MSPs for both the crops. Figure 6 MSPs of crops A and B for low, medium, and high λ values.
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The total crop production quantities for our example are given in Figures 7a and 7b. (Note that the production of each crop is approximately 0.5 so that the production of crops is balanced.) Furthermore, we can observe from Figures 7a and 7b that the crop production quantity disparity decreases as λ decreases because lower values of λ give more importance to consumer welfare, which increases as the production quantity disparity between the crops decreases (we omit separate plots for individual values of λ due to space constraints). 2 ). It is interesting to observe from Figure 8a that farmer surplus is increasing in crop disparity (r). This is due to the fact that, for any given production quantities of the crops, the expected prices of the crops increase as the complementarity between the crops increases. From Figure 8b we observe that the total expenditure incurred by a policy-maker in administering the MSP program is decreasing in r, when r is sufficiently high. Because the expected market prices of the crops are high when r is high, in many instances the crop market prices tend to be 30 higher than the crop MSPs, which obviates the need for the policy-maker to purchase the crop at MSP, thereby reducing the expected expenditure incurred from the MSP program.
Hence, by combining the farmer surplus ( Figure 8a ) and expected expenditure (Figure 8b) plots, we can infer that a policy-maker will achieve a higher farmer surplus at a lower expense by offering MSPs to diverse crops. Finally, from Figure 8c , we observe that the total social surplus increases as r increases.
(a) Farmer surplus (b) Expected expenditure (c) Social welfare Figure 8 Farmer surplus, expected expenditure and social welfare for low, medium, and high λ values
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed the role of minimum support prices (MSPs), which is a government intervention to safeguard farmers' incomes against crop price falls and, at the same time, to ensure sufficient and balanced production of different crops. First, by considering a mixture of myopic and strategic farmers, we analyzed the behavior of myopic and strategic farmers, and their crop selection and production decisions, in the absence of MSPs. Later, we extended our analysis to incorporate MSPs and to analyze their impact, along with past prices, on farmers' crop selection and production decisions, future crop availabilities, and farmers' expected profits. Second, we discussed the impact of strategic farmers on farmers' crop selection and production decisions, future crop availabilities, and farmers' expected First, we showed that, regardless of the MSPs offered to the crops, the price disparity between the crops always worsens as the complementarity between the crops increases.
Second, we found that MSPs may not always be beneficial to farmers. We proved that when there are very few strategic farmers, an improper choice of MSP of a crop can negatively impact the profits of the farmers, both myopic and strategic, who grow that crop. This defeats the actual goal of MSP for a crop, which is to benefit the farmers who grow that crop. Third, we showed that the total production of a crop is increasing in the MSP offered for the crop and decreasing in the MSP offered for the other crop. Therefore, a carefully chosen MSPs can always be used to balance crop productions. Hence, to reduce quantity disparity between crops, a carefully designed MSP policy is critical.
Finally, we formulated the optimization problem of a policy-maker (i.e., government)
with an objective to maximize social welfare (which is the sum of farmers' surplus and consumers' welfare less the policy-maker's expenditure) subject to a budgetary constraint on the expected expenditure incurred by the policy-maker in administering the MSP program.
Given the complexity of the problem, we solved it numerically to draw a few practical insights, especially those pertaining to the impact of nature of crops (i.e., crop complementarity or dissimilarity) on the optimal choice of crop MSPs. First, we noted that, even though crop MSPs are increasing in the complementarity (or dissimilarity) between the crops, the difference between the crop MSPs decreases. Second, we observed that offering
MSPs to dissimilar crops is efficient in achieving higher farmer surplus and higher social welfare at a lower expected expenditure. Hence, we inferred that it is more advantageous to offer MSPs to complementary crops like rice and pulses (or vegetables) than to offer
MSPs to crops that are close substitutes like rice and wheat.
Our paper represents an initial attempt to examine the efficacy of MSPs of two (complementary or substitutable) crops in the presence of market price uncertainty and strategic farmers. However, there are plenty directions for future research. A natural and a challenging extension of our model is to incorporate multiple periods in the presence of hoarding;
i.e., each farmer can sell his perishable crop over the next few period periods). In doing so, one can explore the impact of MSPs on the farmers crop planning and selling decisions over Such a study will provide insights on the design and choice of such long-term programs vis-à-vis short-term (contingent) subsidy programs such as MSPs.
1. Crop availability disparity: The disparity between the total production quantities of the crops decreases with r if there are strategic farmers. That is
2. Crop price disparity: However, the expected disparity between the two crop prices increases with the crop dissimilarity r. That is
. 
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: First, we note that
Hence,
where the last inequality is obtained by using Chebyshev's inequality.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The first statement is proved by using (11) and the fact that
For the second statement, by substituting (23) in (11) and simplifying, we obtain that for every x τ v , v ∈ {m, s},
which is non-negative if ∂τ m ∂m A t = 0. Hence, by using Proposition 3 we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1:
1. The myopic farmers anticipate the price in period t to be the same as the price in period t − 1. A farmer produces crop A as long as the anticipated benefit from crop A is more than that from crop B, otherwise the farmer produces crop B (by Assumption 1). Therefore, the fraction of myopic farmers growing crop A is then given by: 2. The strategic farmers on the other hand are forward-looking and hence anticipate the market price in period t by taking into account the total availability of the crops, which takes into account the behaviors of the myopic farmers and the other strategic farmers. Hence, by using the principle of rational expectations, the fraction of the strategic farmers growing crop A is given by:
From (1), and the fact that q
where q AT t ∈ [0, 1] is the total production quantity of crop A. Therefore, from (14) we obtain the threshold τ s as:
and the total production quantity of crop A by strategic farmers is q = θτ s + θτ m + 0.5 and substituting it in (15) we obtain:
.5] since r < 1 by Assumption 2.
3. The total availability of crop A is given by
and by using (15), we obtain τ = . Note that |τ | = |r r ||τ m | < |τ m | ⇒ τ ∈ [−0.5, 0.5] sincer < r.
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We know that E[p 
For any given set of MSPs (m A t , m B t ), we have exactly one of these three cases to hold: (−1, 1) . Hence, it remains to check ifp In case (i), we note that
t ] < 1, and
In case (ii), we get
t ] > −1, and
Bs t ∈ (−1, 1) always and so we obtain the threshold τ s aŝ
and the total production quantity of crop A by strategic farmers asq 
By substitutingτ = θτ s + θτ m in (21) we obtain (7 0 by its definition given in (6). Next, after differentiating (7) implicitly with respect to m 
However, by definition ofτ , we obtain 
This proves the first statement. Further, by using the equation ( 
Similarly, we obtain 
Note that the signs of . Hence, from (25) we find that if 
